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I. INTRODUCTION
"Foreclosure on a family home is the American dream lost. Foreclosures uproot
families, destroy credit and lock individuals out of the housing market while
destabilizing neighborhoods and lowering property values."' Ohio has been an
"epicenter" of the nation's foreclosure crisis. 2 From 2004 to the present, the City of
Cleveland alone is estimated to have between 10,000 and 25,000 abandoned
properties at any given time,' many of which are the direct result of the city's high
foreclosure rate.4 With the intent to protect its citizens from predatory lending, a
known contributing factor to the foreclosure crisis, and to avert the problem of
abandoned houses and falling property values caused by foreclosures, the City of
Cleveland adopted an anti-predatory lending ordinance on March 1, 2002.' With
these ordinances, municipal leaders sought to protect certain populations, including
minorities, the elderly, and the undereducated, which predatory lenders tend to
target. A majority of these demographics live in Ohio's larger cities.6
Regrettably, this ordinance never came into effect. In American Financial
Services Ass'n v. Cleveland, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the regulation of
predatory lending was "general law" within the meaning of the Home Rule
Amendment in that Ohio's regulation of predatory lending was a comprehensive,
1 Press Release, Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, County Launches Assault of
Foreclosures (Mar. 17, 2006) (on file with author).
2 Lisa Nelson, Foreclosure Filings in Cuyahoga County, in A LOOK BEHIND THE
NUMBERS 1, 2 (2008).
See ALLAN MALLACH ET AL., CLEVELAND AT THE CROSSROADS: TURNING
ABANDONMENT INTO OPPORTUNITY 5 (2005), available at
http://www.vacantproperties.org/latestreports/ ClevelandattheCrossroads.pdf.
4 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 2.
5 CLEVELAND, OHIo, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 659 (2002).
6 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 5; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNTrY SURVEY
3-YEAR ESTIMATES, 2006-2008, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMain
PageServlet?_program-ACS (last visited May 9, 2011). Which populations predatory lenders
tend to target will be discussed at length infra Part I.
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statewide enactment prescribing police regulations that applied throughout the state
and generally to its citizens.7 When a municipal ordinance conflicts with general
laws of the state, state regulations preempt the ordinance.' Courts must apply a
conflict analysis in preemption cases to determine whether there is an actual conflict
between municipal and state law. In that case, the court applied a broad "conflict by
implication" test and determined that Cleveland's stricter lending regulations
conflicted with state law.' The court, however, failed to foresee the disproportionate
impact of predatory lending experienced by Ohio's largest cities-the very problem
that municipal legislatures were trying to protect against through regulation.o
Today, Ohio's cities are plagued by a housing crisis, the impact of which would
have been reduced had municipal predatory lending ordinances remained in effect.
After the preemption of municipal regulations, in Cuyahoga County alone, more
than 45,000 foreclosure cases were filed," many of which can be at least partly
attributed to predatory lending. 2 Even more disheartening, while many people are
losing their homes, certain lenders have been profiting by cheaply acquiring
foreclosed properties in bulk at sheriff's sale and then reselling the bulk packaged
properties in "as is" condition." While on the market, and even after resale, these
properties are often not brought up to city code. This practice creates a public
nuisance1 4 by generating problems such as vandalism, crime, and plummeting
neighborhood values." Municipalities now alone bear the burden to abate the
nuisances created by high foreclosure rates, even though many city leaders foresaw
7 City of Canton v. Ohio, 766 N.E.2d 963, 968 (Ohio 2002).
8 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ohio 2006).
9 2002 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. 94 (2002) (codified at sections 1.63 and 1349.25 through
1349.37 in the Ohio Revised Code); Am. Fin. Serys. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d
at 786; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
10 CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 659 (2002); DAYTON, OHIO, REVISED CODE
OF GENERAL ORDINANCE §§ 112.40-.44 (2002); TOLEDO, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 795.21-
.23 (2002).
1 Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Cases, CLEVELAND.COM, http://www.cleveland.com-
datacentral/foreclosure/ (last visited May 9, 2011) (foreclosure data included from 2006
through early 2009).
12 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 5; Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Owner and Equity Protection
Act of 1994: Extending Liability for Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage
Market Participants, 18 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 151, 158-59 (2005) ("The foreclosure rate
among subprime mortgages is 8% nationally, with some states facing foreclosure rates in
excess of 12%. By comparison, the foreclosure rate for prime loans is 1%.").
'3 C.H.R.P. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 08-CVH-3139, $ 17, 19 (Cleveland Mun. Ct.
Housing Div. June 18, 2009).
14 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3766.41(A)(2)(a) ("'Public nuisance' means a building that
is a menace to the public health, welfare, safety; that is structurally unsafe, unsanitary, or not
provided with adequate safe egress; that constitutes a fire hazard, is otherwise dangerous to
human life, or is otherwise no longer fit and habitable; or that in relation to its existing use,
constitutes a hazard to public health, welfare, or safety by reason of inadequate maintenance,
dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment.").
1s See MALLACH ET AL., supra note 3.
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these problems and sought to protect their communities through predatory lending
regulation."
Through its holding in American Financial Services Ass'n v. Cleveland, the Ohio
Supreme Court denied community leaders the ability to protect their communities by
maintaining a preemption shield that allowed predatory lending to continue. That
court held that predatory lending regulation was not a "general law" within the
meaning of the Ohio Constitution," and in applying a conflict by implication test,
determined that ordinance conflicted with state law.'" Instead, however, the court
could have upheld Cleveland's ordinance by determining it was not a general law by
considering the totality of the circumstances, including the local interest and intent
behind the ordinance. Also, the court could have used a direct conflict analysis that
would have allowed stricter municipal regulations not directly contradicting state
law to remain effective. Supported and shared by the Framers' intent for the Home
Rule Amendment and by other jurisdictions, either approach would give greater
consideration to local ordinances passed with the intent of protecting local
communities.' Because of the disproportionate impact suffered by Ohio
municipalities that sought to protect themselves from predatory lending, Ohio courts
should modify their Home Rule analysis. Adopting these proposed modifications to
the Home Rule analysis would ensure that local interests are given weight not only
in regard to future predatory lending regulation, but also generally to guarantee that
municipalities can regulate under their Home Rule police power when necessary for
the protection of their communities.
Part II of this note defines predatory lending, describes the impact of predatory
lending, and summarizes efforts to combat these lending practices. Part III discusses
Ohio's Home Rule Amendment, the unpredictable conflict analysis applied by Ohio
courts, and how Ohio's approach compares with those of federal courts and other
states. In Part IV, this note contends that the Ohio Supreme Court effectively upheld
a preemption shield that allowed predatory lending to continue in Ohio's cities, thus
contributing to the public nuisance burden now carried by Ohio's municipalities.
Additionally, this section proposes policy to modify Ohio courts' Home Rule
analysis by allowing greater local considerations to promote consistency and fairness
in court decisions.
16 A recent study in a survey of eight Ohio cities found that unused properties cost the cities a
total of $15 million in extra municipal services and $49 million in lost property tax revenues.
CMTY. RESEARCH PARTNERS & REBUILD OHIo, $60 MILLION AND COUNTING: THE COST OF
VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES To EIGHT OHIo CrriEs (2008), available at http:
//communityresearchpartners.org/uploads/publications//FullReport everythingbutcitysections.
pdf. Municipalities employ numerous methods to deal with public nuisance caused by abandoned
properties. See infra section II.B.
17 See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 784.
" Id. at 785-86.
19 See U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of Longmont, 948 P.2d 509, 515 (Colo. 1997)
(considering local interests in totality of the circumstances analysis); Walsh v. City of River
Rouge, 189 N.W.2d 318, 324 (Mich. 1971) ("Mere differences in detail do not render [statute
and ordinance] conflicting. If either is silent where the other speaks, there can be no conflict
between them. Where no conflict exists, both laws stand.... As a general rule, additional
regulation to that of a state law does not constitute a conflict therewith.").
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II. OVERVIEW OF PREDATORY LENDING IN OHIO
A. What Is Predatory Lending?
Predatory lending falls within the classification of subprime lending. Subprime
lending is a mortgage market that services borrowers who have lower-than-average
credit scores and would otherwise be denied credit. In order to compensate for the
additional risk associated with these loans, borrowers are charged higher interest
rates.20 "[F]rom a lender's perspective, all residential home mortgages roughly may
be categorized as either prime or subprime; the grouping is simply a function of a
lender's view of the risk involved with extending credit to the particular borrower." 21
If the borrower meets certain criteria, he qualifies for a prime rate mortgage;
however, if he does not meet these criteria, he only qualifies for a subprime loan.
From the borrower's perspective, being screened by creditors for a loan based on
risk suggests that there is a clear distinction between those borrowers who qualify
for prime mortgages and those who only qualify for the lower standards of the
subprime loans.22
Predatory lending includes "a broad range of unfair and deceptive lending
practices that are primarily practiced within the subprime market." 23 Predatory loans
are often secured by the borrower's primary residence, and because the average
American holds the majority of her wealth in the form of homeownership, 24
predatory lending puts not only a person's residence at risk, but also any assets the
borrower has upon default. 25 Predatory lending can be immensely profitable for the
perpetrator who collects large origination fees and high interest rates on timely
20 See Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime Lending Industry: An Industry in Crisis, 124
BANKING L.J. 407, 408 (2007). "A typical subprime borrower has a low FICO score (a credit
score created by Fair Isaac Corporation to measure consumer credit worthiness), and a lower
net income than average." Id.
21 Nathaniel R. Hull, Note, Cross the Line: Prime, Subprime and Predatory Lending, 61
ME. L. REV. 287, 292 (2009).
22 See Tashman, supra note 20, at 407-08.
23 Kimm Tynan, Note, Pennsylvania Welcomes Predatory Lenders: Pennsylvania's Act 55
Preempts Philadelphia's Tough Ordinance but Provides Little Protection for Vulnerable
Borrowers, 34 RUTGERS L. J. 837, 839-40 (2003).
24 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 6 (1995). Homeownership is central to the wealth
portfolio of the average American and makes up the largest part of wealth held by the middle
class. In comparison, the upper classes more commonly hold a greater degree of their wealth
in financial assets. Id.
25 Tynan, supra note 23, at 839-40. The goal of a subprime predatory loan is the attempt
to mine as much equity out of a home as possible. This is done by lenders steering
homeowners into high rate mortgages that are packed with many additional fees, expenses,
costs, points, and onerous terms as possible in order to "maximize up-front profits and to keep
the borrower economically hostage." Cecil J. Hunt, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering
Racially Targeted Predatory Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U.
TOL. L. REV. 211, 223 (2003). Refinancing options designed to drain as much equity as
possible further deplete the homeowner's equity. When the value of the home is exhausted,
the property, often a personal residence, is foreclosed and sold at auction. Id.
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26payments and forecloses on any equity in the house when the borrower cannot pay.
"The primary targets of these abusive loans are vulnerable homeowners who are
cash poor but home equity rich, and who, for a variety of reasons, are either in fact,
or simply believe they are, shut out of the mainstream credit markets and have
nowhere else to turn for credit."27
Instead of a borrower simply being a greater credit risk, recent studies suggest
that predatory lenders target the most susceptible populations, including racial and
ethnic minorities, low-income communities, and the undereducated who often must
seek financing in the subprime market. 28 African Americans "and Hispanics are
disproportionately represented in the subprime market, even at upper-income
levels."29 Increased levels of subprime lending in minority communities suggest that
such communities may be subject to increased lending abuses. "The United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") reported five times more
subprime loans are originated in predominantly African-American neighborhoods
than white neighborhoods."30 Additionally, "[f]ow- and moderate-income families,
women, and older homeowners may be overrepresented in the subprime and
predatory markets."" Deceitful lenders often target the elderly because they
typically have substantial equity in their homes, their diminished faculties impair
their ability to understand loan terms, and this expose them to aggressive sales
tactics, all of which makes them easier targets for predatory lenders.3 2
As over 80% of subprime loans are refinanced loans based on existing equity, it
is not surprising that predatory lending has been confirmed as a contributing factor
to high foreclosure rates. 3 In fact, the national foreclosure rate for properties with
subprime mortgages is 8% compared to a foreclosure rate of only 1% for prime
loans.34 Lenders often entice borrowers "to take on long-term credit secured by the
borrowers' home equity to pay for mounting credit card, health care, or other
unsecured, short-term consumer debts."" The minority, elderly, and undereducated
26 Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending,
Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 1303, 1314-15 (2006).
27 Hunt, supra note 25, at 214.
28 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 5; Tynan, supra note 23, at 839-40. In 2002, home
ownership rates for whites were almost 75%, while the home ownership rates for blacks were
only 49%. A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: The Homeowner
Dilemma, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 19, 22 (2004). This racial home ownership gap must be
put into perspective because it further elucidates the disproportionate impact predatory lending
has had on at-risk populations.
29 Elizabeth Renuart, An Overview of the Predatory Mortgage Lending Process, 15
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 467, 477 (2004).
30 Christopher R. Childs, Comment, So You've Been Preempted-What Are You Going to
Do Now?: Solutions for States Following Federal Preemption of State Predatory Lending
Statutes, 2004 BYU L. REv. 701, 709 (2004).
31 Renuart, supra note 29, at 478.
32 Childs, supra note 30, at 709.
3 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 5; Keyfetz, supra note 12, at 158-59.
34 Keyfetz, supra note 12, at 158.
3s Id. at 159.
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populations that are most susceptible to predatory lenders are far more common in
urban areas of the state. Thus, there is an exceedingly high concentration of
foreclosures within Ohio's cities.36 Beyond the financial and psychological impact
that foreclosure has on families, "geographic concentration of foreclosures
undoubtedly leads to negative spillover effects-in particular, increased numbers of
vacant and abandoned properties.""
B. Abandoned Properties and the Economic Impact ofPredatory Lending
Ohio has been an "epicenter" of the nation's foreclosure crisis." Currently, Ohio
has 46,361 active foreclosure properties, 8,089 of which are located in Cleveland,
Dayton, and Toledo." In Cuyahoga County alone, more than 45,000 foreclosure
cases were filed from the beginning of 2006 through early 2009.40 As there is a
direct correlation between foreclosure rates and predatory lending,4' the foreclosure
rates in these cities are of particular interest because each had ordinances regulating
predatory lending preempted by state law.42 After foreclosure, properties that do not
sell at sheriff's sale, or are purchased but left in "as is" condition, soon become
abandoned.43
"An abandoned property is a property where the owner has stopped carrying out
at least one of the significant responsibilities of property ownership, as a result of
which the property is vacant, or likely to become vacant in the immediate future." "
Abandoned properties are often classified as a "public nuisance," which the Ohio
Revised Code defines as:
36 Of Ohio's population: 11.7% is black, 6.1% of households speak a language other than
English, 87% have at least a high school level education, and 9.7% of families live below the
poverty line while 11% of its housing is vacant. Id. For comparison, of Cleveland's
population: 52.5% is black, 11.7% of households speak a language other than English, 74.7%
have at least a high school education, and 23.9% of families are below the poverty line while
22.1% of its housing is vacant. Id. Toledo, Dayton, Cincinnati, and Columbus are similar to
Cleveland with greater concentrations of "at risk" demographics than Ohio generally. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 6.
n Nelson, supra note 2, at 8.
38 Id. at 2.
3 Ohio Foreclosures, NATIONAL RELOCATION, http://bank-foreclosures.nationalrelocation
.com/Ohio/ (last visited May 9, 2011) (numbers calculated as of Mar. 27, 2011).
40 Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Cases, supra note 11 (foreclosure data included from
2006 through early 2009).
41 Nelson, supra note 2, at 5.
42 See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006); Am. Fin.
Servs. Ass'n v. City of Toledo, 830 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); City of Dayton v.
Ohio, 813 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
43 C.H.R.P. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 08-CVH-3139, 17, 19 (Cleveland Mun. Ct.
Housing Div. June 18, 2009).
4 ALLAN MALLACH, BRINGING BUILDINGS BACK: FROM ABANDONED PROPERTIES TO
COMMUNITY ASSETS 1 (2005).
13 1
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[A] menace to the public health, welfare, safety; that is structurally
unsafe, unsanitary, or not provided with adequate safe egress; that
constitutes a fire hazard, is otherwise dangerous to human life, or is
otherwise no longer fit and habitable; or that in relation to its existing use,
constitutes a hazard to public health, welfare, or safety by reason of
inadequate maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment.45
Abandoned properties clearly fit the Ohio Revised Code's definition of "public
nuisance" by posing significant dangers to communities, especially urban
neighborhoods." Abandoned properties "drive down property values, create health
hazards, threaten the safety of residents, and perpetuate an image of the
neighborhood which promotes criminal behavior and discourages redevelopment."'
Owners of abandoned properties allow these problems to perpetuate. The "Broken
Windows" theory asserts that the mere existence of abandoned housing detrimentally
affects a neighborhood because it demonstrates to outsiders and residents that the
neighborhood is of the type that supports crime and poverty, creating a vicious cycle
that encourages additional abandonment."
Abandonment occurs for a multitude of reasons, with economic variables being
the dominant cause, normally occurring in poorer urban areas with lower property
values.49 If a property owner views a property as a drain on resources that cannot
produce income, even in the long-term, abandonment of the property becomes an
attractive alternative. When the expense of rehabilitation is greater than any
potential return on investment into a property, abandonment can become a cost-
effective alternative.o In Ohio's cities, as a direct result of a faltering regional
economy" and high foreclosure rateS,52 the estimates of abandoned properties in
2007 range between 10,000 and 25,000 in Cleveland, 5 2,000 in Toledo,54 and 3,500
in Dayton.s5
45 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3766.4 1(A)(2)(a).
46 Bill Hormann, Toledo Struggles to Keep Up with Homes, 13 ABC NEWs TOLEDO, Nov.
20, 2009, http://abclocal.go.com/wtvg/storysection=news/local&id=7129232 ("Kids will be
going in [abandoned propertyl. You have to worry about it getting caught on fire.").
47 Matthew J. Samsa, Note, Reclaiming Abandoned Properties: Using Public Nuisance
Suits and Land Banks to Pursue Economic Redevelopment, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 189, 196
(2008).
48 Id
49 Samsa, supra note 47, at 195. Returns on investment are going to be reduced when the
property would not sell for a high price, even if that property itself was in perfect condition
but its proximity to other dilapidated properties diminishes any return on investment from the
property.
50 MALLACH, supra note 44, at 5 (describing physical obsolescence and abandonment as
an alternative to investment).
51 Samsa, supra note 47, at 195; see MALLACH ET AL., supra note 3, at 5.
52 Nelson, supra note 2, at 5. "All of these [abandonment] conditions are made worse by
practices such as predatory lending or speculative 'flipping' of properties, which lead to
situations where properties end up being abandoned." Samsa, supra note 47, at 195 n.46.
s3 MALLACH ET AL., supra note 3, at 5.
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While Ohio cities are reeling from the blight caused by abandoned homes, banks
practicing predatory lending are often profiting from this situation by following a
business plan in which they cheaply acquire foreclosed properties in bulk at sheriff s
sales and then resell the bulk packaged properties in "as is" condition." A lender
"takes title to property which is already vacant, or evicts the occupants, to cause the
property to become vacant. It then boards the property to secure it, cuts the grass,
markets the property and sells it, without ever bringing the property up to City
code."" Additionally, the appraisal value for the auction will often fall short of the
amount actually owed on the mortgage. Then, often a lender will cancel the
foreclosure, again putting the original owner, who had thought the house had gone
back to the lender, on the hook for the growing property taxes and zoning fines from
the city for the property." Regardless of whether it is the lender or borrower who
actually holds title, the failure of the owner to bring these vacant properties up to city
code creates a public nuisance." Business plans such as this and other real estate
speculation schemes contribute to abandonment because lenders invest as little
capital as possible into properties, often leaving them in a state of disrepair, in hopes
of making large profits when the real estate market recovers.'
Ohio's cities are left to deal with these abandoned properties. A recent study in a
survey of eight Ohio cities found that unused properties cost the cities a total of $15
million in extra municipal services and $49 million in lost property tax revenues-a
total drain of more than $64 million." Rather than engage in traditional common
law public nuisance abatement suits, municipalities tend to employ abatement means
in the form of code enforcement and tax foreclosure.62 Unfortunately, "[n]either
method was designed specifically to address abandonment and, thus, neither method
can effectively be harnessed to combat neighborhood blight.",6  Municipalities
through their police power can enforce housing codes to abate nuisances rather than
rely on resource-consuming litigation." The problem with this approach is that even
if it is feasible for the city, property owners can easily avoid enforcement, or as these
54 See Hormann, supra note 46.
5 See CMTY. RESEARCH PARTNERS & REBUILD OIo, supra note 16, at 2-7.
56 C.H.R.P. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 08-CVH-3139, % 17, 19 (Cleveland Mun. Ct.
Housing Div. June 18, 2009).
1 Id. at$ 27.
58 See Ken McCall, Owners of Abandoned Properties Are Hard to Track Down, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 17, 2009, available at http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/dayton-
news/352641.htmil.
5 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3766.4 1(A)(2)(a).
6 Geoff Dutton, Flipping Frenzy: Wealthy Investors Profit from Run-Down Houses,
COLUMBUs DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 2005, at Al.
61 See CMTY. RESEARCH PARTNERS & REBUILD OIo, supra note 16.
62 Samsa, supra note 47, at 197-200.
63 Id. at 197.
6 MALLACH, supra note 44, at 41.
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properties are often in dilapidated conditions, owners lack the means to abate the
nuisance."
Tax foreclosure also fails to serve efficiently as a means of nuisance abatement.
Because owners, especially property speculators, have kept up with their tax
payments, municipalities are often unable to reach vacant properties through this
method." Further, even when a municipality is able to reach an abandoned property
through a tax foreclosure proceeding, the process is lengthy, and there is no
guarantee that the property will sell at auction, essentially leaving the property in a
nuisance state rather than generating any economic benefit. 6
Another more effective alternative for municipalities to reduce blight is pursuing
private nuisance abatement suits. "Privatized nuisance abatement suits are
proceedings brought by plaintiffs other than the government on the basis of a public
nuisance."" Non-profit entities with the purpose of community redevelopment
through government authority, often a statute, can put forth a more focused effort in
redeveloping neighborhoods."
While private nuisance abatement suits have proved somewhat effective in
comparison to other abatement methods,"o these suits and other initiatives for
redevelopment and affordable home ownership still effectively drain both public and
private resources." The main problem with these solutions is that a municipality
must use them after the damage is effectively done. Allowing municipal regulation
beforehand to deter predatory lending is necessary to protect individual
communities, and to give both municipalities and private parties a legal remedy for
breach of these ordinances.7
65 See Samsa, supra note 47, at 198.
66 MALLACH, supra note 44, at 1; see Samsa, supra note 47, at 199.
67 See Samsa, supra note 47, at 199. "Foreclosing agencies looking to return the property
to the tax rolls put it up for auction, which often results in vacancy when homes fail to sell at
auction." Id.
68 Id. at 201.
69 Id. at 202.
70 Id. "The residents who drive CDCs also maintain a long-term stake in revitalizing the
neighborhood, which increases the likelihood of successful rehabilitation of homes." Id.
71 See CMTY. RESEARCH PARTNERS & REBUILD OHIO, supra note 16; Hormann, supra note
46. "Toledo needs more inspectors, needs to hold landlords accountable for their property,
and needs to tear down these buildings before they blight a neighborhood. But Toledo needs
money to make all that happen." Id.
72 See generally Abraham B. Putney, Note, Rules, Standards, and Suitability: Finding the
Correct Approach to Predatory Lending, 71 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2101, 2103 (2003) (stating that
predatory lending legislation would be more effective if it subjected lenders to a clear,
objective standard rather than a subjective one).
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C. Regulating Predatory Lending
1. Federal Predatory Lending Regulation
To deal with the spreading foreclosure crisis, national, state, and local
governments took action to slow predatory lending." The principal federal law
regarding predatory lending is the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
("HOEPA"). 7 4 Congress passed HOEPA in 1994 as an addendum to the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA")." TILA itself was enacted in 1968 to promote informed use
of consumer credit by requiring creditors to provide potential borrowers with helpful
information regarding certain credit transactions, but it was not created to respond
specifically to predatory lending in the home equity subprime market.16
Unlike TILA, HOEPA was a legislative response directly intended to curb
"prohibitive and coercive mechanisms to control lender and broker behavior.""
HOEPA tries to identify "high-cost" loans by mandating lenders to disclose certain
information to borrowers." Under HOEPA, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve is authorized to alter the scope of the act's coverage, meaning alter which
loans are subject to the act and subject to this regulatory authority." Generally,
HOEPA also seeks to prevent unfair terms in mortgage loans such as increased
default rates, prepayment penalties, and balloon payments.so Further, HOEPA
prevents lenders from granting high-cost loans without first considering a borrower's
ability to repay.'
Critics of HOEPA claim the act is ineffective because "it is not sufficiently
inclusive."82 Even if federal regulation has been able to curb predatory lending,
73 Approximately forty states, counties, and municipalities have adopted predatory lending
laws attempting to protect homeowners from predatory mortgage brokers and lenders.
Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking
Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
515, 516 (2007). "[D]emocratically-elected state representatives all across the country
responded to their constituents' demands by adopting such legislation, and no federal statute
had ever explicitly authorized the unelected beltway banking custodians to dismiss these state
consumer protection laws." Id. State and local predatory lending legislation will be discussed
infra Parts II.C.2 and II.C.3.
74 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2006).
1 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2010).
76 See Joshua Michael Stolly, Note, Subprime Lending: Ohioans Fall Prey to Predatory
Lending at Record Levels-What Next?, 34 Omo N.U. L. REv. 289, 302-03 (2008); Keyfetz,
supra note 12, at 163.
77 Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the Mortgage Broker-Borrower
Relationship: A Role for Agency Principles in Predatory Lending Regulations, 73 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1471, 1486 (2005).
78 See Stolly, supra note 76, at 300-01.
7 Id. at 301.
s 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2006); see Stolly, supra note 76, at 301.
8 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2006); see Stolly, supra note 76, at 301.
82 Forrester, supra note 26, at 1317.
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HOEPA still allows for predatory lenders to avoid being subject to the act by
avoiding certain "triggers" in the act, while still subjecting borrowers to much higher
rates than those with prime credit scores." Because federal predatory lending
regulation through HOEPA and TILA still allows maneuverability for predatory
lenders, Ohio and its cities, along with other states and municipalities throughout the
country, have sought to supplement federal regulation to meet the needs of their
specific communities.
2. Predatory Lending Regulation in States and Cities
More than thirty states including Ohio have enacted legislation designed to
address predatory lending problems." While similar to HOEPA, many state and
local regulations provide more inclusive protection than HOEPA." Despite such
additional protections, the success of regulation at the state level has been minimal at
best with subprime markets continuing to grow because of the difficulty in enforcing
statewide laws."
Not surprisingly, lenders have fought regulations on the state level and proposed
that federal law should preempt state law." Lenders received a partial victory when,
pursuant to the Home Owner's Loan Act, the Office of Thrift Supervision issued
regulations preempting state lending regulations that affect the operations of federal
savings associations." Similarly, the Office of the Comptroller issued a regulation
preempting state laws governing mortgage lending as applied to national banks and
their subsidiaries." This has created the incentive for lenders to apply for status as a
"national bank" or "federal savings association" within the meaning of the
regulations to avoid state and local predatory lending statutes.o
Municipalities likewise followed the trend of enacting local ordinances to combat
predatory lending but have been consistently preempted by state law. The
Pennsylvania General Assembly expressly overruled Philadelphia's predatory
lending ordinance by "prohibiting municipalities 'from enacting and enforcing
ordinances, resolutions and regulations pertaining to' the activities of financial
83 The national average interest for a fixed thirty-year mortgage was around 6% while
subprime borrowers are paying 13% for the same amount of money. See Stolly, supra note
76, at 301-02.
8 Forrester, supra note 26, at 1319.
85 Id Most states have restrictions or requirements beyond HOEPA for loans that are
covered. Id.
86 See id. at 1320.
87 See id. at 1321-22.
" 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2010).
89 Id. § 34.4.
90 See Forrester, supra note 26, at 1339-42. While these regulations occupy a good deal of
subprime market lending, issues remain as to the ability of these organizations to police their
regulations and the extent of their authority. Id. at 1347-49; see also Young v. Wells Fargo &
Co., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1019 (S.D. Iowa 2009) ("If a state statute of general applicability
is not substantively pre-empted, then the power of enforcement must rest with the State and
not with the National Government.").
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institutions, lenders and brokers."" In New York, the superior court invalidated a
New York City ordinance that prohibited the city from doing business with
predatory lenders.92 In that case, even though there was no express preemption, the
court held that the state's banking law occupied that field, and thus, state law
implicitly preempted the city ordinance." Also, the California Supreme Court held
California law preempted a City of Oakland ordinance in which both measures
sought to regulate home loans.94 Even though Oakland's restrictions on lending
were stricter than state regulation, the court held that the state act did not allow for
local regulation in the field."
3. Ohio State and Municipal Predatory Lending Regulation
When the state of Ohio enacted its predatory lending regulations in February
2002, the General Assembly made clear that the act was "intended as a clarification
of existing law and not as a substantive change in the law."" The Ohio enactment
integrated much of the substance of the federal Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994 into Ohio law.97 Interestingly, the very banks involved in
nuisance abatement suits were also heavily involved in Ohio's legislative process
regarding predatory lending regulation." This enactment required lenders to
disclose certain information to mortgagors and limit certain terms of mortgage loans,
including the amount of a loan payment that can be collected up front and the
prohibition of balloon payments for loans with terms of less than five years.99
The City of Cleveland adopted its own anti-predatory lending ordinance on
March 1, 2002. Cleveland's ordinance sought to regulate loans at a lower threshold,
reaching loans with interest rates three and a half percentage points below those that
the state regulated.'" Additionally, the municipal ordinance required stricter
91 Tynan, supra note 23, at 880.
92 Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d 266, 275-76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2004).
9 Id. at 274; Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City Governments and Predatory
Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 780 (2007).
94 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 829 (Cal. 2005).
9s Id. at 819-20; Entin & Yazback, supra note 93, at 773.
96 H.B. 386, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2002).
9 OmIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1.63, 1349.25-.37.
98 See generally Cleveland Housing Renewal Project v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 08-CVH-
31391 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. Housing Div. June 18, 2009); City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest
Mortgage Securities, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Tynan, supra note 23 at
880.
9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.27.
100 The Cleveland ordinance prohibited any predatory loan that either was secured by a first
mortgage and having an interest rate between four and a half and eight percentage points
above the yield on certain treasury securities, or secured by a junior mortgage and having an
interest rate between six and a half and ten percentage points above that treasury yield and
made under certain enumerated circumstances, i.e., excessive increasing of interest rates upon
default. CLEVELAND, Omo, CODIFIED ORDINANCEs § 659.01(f) (2002).
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requirements on lenders such as mandatory loan counseling for the borrower, filing a
certification of compliance contemporaneously with the recording of a mortgage,
and prohibiting any direct payment to home improvement contractors of the
proceeds of any residential loan having an interest rate in violation of this
ordinance.' 1 Further, certain violations of the ordinance could result in criminal
sanctions.'0 2 In American Financial Services Ass'n v. Cleveland, the Ohio Supreme
Court struck down the Cleveland ordinance, holding that it conflicted with Ohio law
because it regulated matters within the general scope of the state's regulations.'
Cleveland was not the only Ohio city trying to regulate a growing predatory loan
problem. In July 2001, the City of Dayton passed a similar ordinance to deter
predatory lending that was struck down by the Ohio Second District Court of
Appeals.'0 Dayton's ordinance sought to regulate loans at a lower threshold than
Ohio's regulation and could reach the loan at any point during the life of the loan
whenever the percentage rates rise above impermissible ranges. 105
Likewise, Toledo passed municipal predatory lending regulation that contained
nearly identical prohibitions as the state laws; however, certain differences did exist
between the ordinance and state law, such as a credit-insurance disclosure
requirement.' 6 Because of these differences, Toledo's ordinance was challenged in
American Financial Services Ass'n v. Toledo, but the court held that provisions of
the statutes not in direct conflict with the state regulation could be severed from the
unconstitutional portions of the municipal ordinance.' The Toledo ordinance
provisions left intact after this ruling lost effect after the Ohio Supreme Court in
American Financial Services Ass'n v. Cleveland designated predatory lending
regulations as general law that occupied the entire field.0 s
Currently in Ohio, after the Ohio Supreme Court held that the General Assembly
alone had the power to regulate predatory lending, Ohio and its cities remain among
the nation's worst affected by the foreclosure crisis.'" With the intent to further
protect against predatory lending, the General Assembly passed the Ohio's
Homebuyer Protection Act to include further restrictions that required lenders to
consider a borrower's ability to repay, banned repeated refinancing that does not
benefit the borrower, prohibited taking advantage of borrowers who were illiterate or
with mental deficiencies, and restricted excessive late fees on a single late
'0 Id. §§ 659.02(a)(2)-(3), 659.04.
102 Id. § 659.99.
103 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776, 786 (Ohio 2006).
'4 City of Dayton v. Ohio, 813 N.E.2d 707, 724 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
1o5 DAYTON, OHIo, REv. CODE GEN. ORD. §§ 112.40-44 (2004).
'0 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Toledo, 830 N.E.2d 1233, 1247-48 (Ohio Ct. App.
2005).
107 Id. at 1248-49.
108 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 786.
' Melinda Fulmer, States Ranked by Foreclosure Rates, MSN REAL ESTATE (2008),
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=13107814 (last visited May 9, 2011);
see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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payment.1 0 While it is too soon to analyze any potential benefit of more recent state
predatory lending regulation, it is clear that the damage has been done; however,
municipalities may have been able to prevent at least some of the harm that has been
caused to Ohio's cities by predatory lending.
III. CONFLICT ANALYSIS UNDER OHIO's HOME RULE AMENDMENT
In order to avoid a duplication of the dire situation presented by predatory
lending currently plaguing Ohio's cities, Ohio courts should afford municipalities
the regulatory police powers they were intended to have under the Home Rule
Amendment. Adopted in 1912 during the Ohio Constitutional Convention, the
Home Rule Amendment grants authority to Ohio's municipalities "to exercise all
powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws.""' In other words, the Home Rule Amendment allows municipal sovereignty
in matters of local self-government, subject to constitutional limitations.112
Municipalities may also enact regulations under their police power, but when such
regulations reach beyond local matters, the municipal ordinance must not conflict
with state law."'
Prior to the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment, municipalities could
exercise only those powers that the Ohio General Assembly delegated to them.114
The original draft stated that powers of local government were to be subject to
"general laws," but that section was changed to prohibit only municipal ordinances
that conflicted with state statutes."' The original draft also provided that "no such
regulations shall . .. be deemed in conflict therewith unless the general assembly, by
general law, affecting the welfare of the state as a whole, shall specifically deny all
municipalities the right to act thereon."" The intent behind the Amendment was to
allow municipalities the option to have different forms of municipal organization, to
give municipalities all the powers of local governance that did not conflict with the
state's general laws, and to define and expand municipal power in the operation of
local utilities."' These goals were the consequence of compromise between those
wanting the state to remain superior and those desiring that municipalities have
complete sovereignty. While municipalities were not granted complete sovereignty,
they were given limited power in those areas set out by the Amendment."' Ohio's
10 2006 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. 1478 (West).
"' OIO CONsT. art. XVIII, § 3.
112 City of Canton v. Whitman, 337 N.E.2d 766, 769 (Ohio 1975).
113 JOHN MARTINEZ, I LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw § 4:13 (West 2010).
114 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINo J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIo STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 327 (2004); see Kevin P. Shannon, Note, Speeding Toward Disaster: How
Cleveland's Traffic Cameras Violate the Ohio Constitution, 55 CLEv. Sr. L. REv. 607, 627
(2007).
" GEORGE VAUBEL, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN Omuo 679 (1978).
116 Id.
" Id. at 14-15.
118 Id.
139
HeinOnline  -- 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 139 2011
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss1/6
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
courts are charged with the task of determining the extent of these powers by
interpreting the Home Rule Amendment and ordinances written under its
authority."
In the Home Rule analysis, a court must first determine whether the matter in
question involves an exercise of local self-government or an exercise of local police
power. 2o If the city ordinance involves only an exercise of local self-government,
the Home Rule analysis stops because a municipality is granted such power under
the Ohio Constitution;12' however, if the city ordinance involves the concurrent
police power shared between local and state governments, then a court must
determine if the state statute qualifies as general law. When a court determines that
an exercise of municipal police power is in conflict with the general law, the
ordinance must yield.122 Ohio's courts must ensure that municipal police power
ordinances "survive long enough to face a conflict test against a state statute" to
comply with the Amendment.123 The local police power is derived directly from the
Home Rule Amendment, so even an express legislative provision cannot extinguish
this power and avoid a conflict test.124 Also, courts should not find state legislation
automatically occupies an entire field just because the General Assembly has
regulated some matter in that field.
A. Exercise ofLocal Self-Governance or Local Police Power
Under the Home Rule analysis, a court will first determine whether the ordinance
in question involves a municipality's exercise of "local self-government" or "local
police power."' 25 Local self-government includes those matters relating "solely to
the government and administration of the internal affairs of the municipality."' 26
"The Ohio Supreme Court has described the powers of local self-government to be
those whose nature and field of operation are 'local and municipal in character'-'all
matters of a purely local nature."" 27 Courts must consider the effect of the
municipal ordinance when deciding whether to classify the ordinance as self-
governance. If the result of the ordinance has no effect outside of the municipality,
then the ordinance is derived from the municipality's self-government power;
119 See Fondessy Enter. v. City of Oregon, 492 N.E.2d 797, 803 (Locher, J., concurring).
120 City of Dayton v. Ohio, 813 N.E.2d at 713.
121 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
122 Gregory M. Saul, Comment, Constitutional Issues Under Ohio's New Regulatory
Framework for Video Service Providers, 37 CAP. U. L. REv. 819, 840 (2009); Am. Fin. Serv.
Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 780.
12 Fondessy Enter., 492 N.E.2d at 800.
124 id
125 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 780.
126 Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 148 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ohio 1958).
127 Saul, supra note 122, at 840 (citing Britt v. City of Columbus, 309 N.E.2d 412, 415
(Ohio 1974)).
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however, if the effect of the ordinance is extraterritorial, then the General Assembly
may regulate on such matters. 128
Municipal regulations derived from the local police power are premised not only
on protecting the "public health, safety, morals and general welfare," but also "in
promoting the comfort, convenience and peace of mind" of its citizens.'29 Municipal
regulations promulgated to deter predatory lending clearly fall within this
category.'30 Those regulations sought to protect individuals and their communities at
risk to predatory lenders from the dangerous repercussions of the illicit practice. If
the ordinance is a police regulation, then courts must continue the Home Rule
analysis.
B. "General Law" Within the Meaning of the Home Rule Amendment
Next, the court must apply the test set forth in Canton v. Ohio to determine if a
state law constitutes "general law" within the meaning of the Home Rule
Amendment.' ' The state enactment must (1) be part of a statewide, comprehensive
legislative enactment, (2) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally, (3)
apply equally to all parts of the state, and (4) set forth police, sanitary, or similar
regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a
municipality.132  Ohio courts occasionally meld these factors into a general
consideration of whether a comprehensive statutory plan is necessary to promote the
safety and welfare of all the citizens of this state and is, thus, an issue of statewide
concern. 133
In comparison to Ohio's Home Rule analysis, California courts, in considering
whether regulation is a matter of state-level concern, look to the intent of the state
legislature. Local legislation enters an area that is "fully occupied" when the
legislature has expressly manifested its intent to fully occupy the field, or impliedly
when:
(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general
law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state
concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law
couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state
concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the
subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject
is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the
128 Id. Examples of valid exercises of local self-government include "municipal elections,
municipal ordinances regarding employees' military leave, zoning ordinances, and
establishing and operating a police department." Id. at 841.
129 City of Maple Heights v. Ephraim, 898 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Ghaster Prop., Inc. v. Preston, 200 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio 1964)).
130 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 780-81 (issue of whether the
ordinance constituted a police regulation rather than local self governance was uncontested).
'' City of Canton v. Ohio, 766 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio 2002).
132 Id. at 968.
1 See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 782.
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transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the
locality.13 4
This approach is distinguishable from Ohio's general law analysis in that it looks at
how the legislation operates when the legislature has not expressly preempted
municipal regulation. Particularly of interest, when state law partially covers a
subject matter, California courts must balance the harm to state citizens generally
with the local benefits secured through municipal regulation.'
Similarly, Colorado courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether an issue is one of state, local, or mixed concern. Colorado courts consider
factors "including the need for statewide uniformity of regulation, extraterritorial
impact, other state interests, and local interests.""' By considering local interests,
Colorado's approach offers some protection to municipalities' home rule police
power and to legislative intent behind the ordinances.
C. Conflict Analysis Under Home Rule Amendment
1. Ohio's Conflict Analysis
Once a court finds that a state enactment is "general law," it is imperative that the
Home Rule analysis continues to an actual conflict.' To do otherwise would deny
municipalities their powers granted by the Home Rule Amendment because the
Amendment expressly states that municipal regulations "as are not in conflict with
general laws" are permissible.' Ohio courts cannot simply merge the general law
analysis into the final determination of whether a municipal ordinance stands.
In Fondessy Enterprises, Inc. v. Oregon, a hazardous waste landfill owner sought
to have a municipal ordinance imposing a fee and recordkeeping requirements
declared invalid because it conflicted with a state law regulating landfills.'39 In that
case, the court held that local and state power had concurrent authority under their
police power that did not conflict with each other because the power conferred upon
municipalities by the Home Rule Amendment cannot be withdrawn by the
legislature, and authority to adopt and enforce police regulations is limited only by
general laws in actual conflict.'" The courts below in that case were found to be in
error because they relied exclusively on preemption grounds; finding that state law
generally occupied the field of hazardous material regulation, rather than applying
the direct conflict test set out by the Ohio Supreme Court in Struthers v. Sokol.14 '
134 City of Claremont v. Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14 (2009).
's Allowing a local consideration to permeate the courts' determination of whether state
law is a general law that may conflict with a municipal ordinance would be beneficial to
Ohio's municipalities and will be discussed further infra Part IV.
136 U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of Longmont, 948 P.2d 509, 515 (Colo. 1997).
137 See Saul, supra note 122, at 840.
138 Omfo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
139 Fondessy Enter., 492 N.E.2d at 798.
'4 Id. at 800.
141 Id.; Vill. of Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E. 519 (Ohio 1923).
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After Ohio courts have determined that the applicable state law is "general law"
and then moved into a conflict analysis, they have varied inconsistently when using
the test to resolve whether a conflict exists. Under a direct conflict analysis, the test
set out by the Ohio Supreme Court in Struthers is "whether the ordinance permits or
licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa."l42 In other
words, a statute and an ordinance may cover the same general matter where an
ordinance regulates an issue not addressed by the statute,'43 but when the ordinance
declares something to be prohibited that the state law permits, conflict exists.'"
In other instances, Ohio courts have varied from this direct standard and instead
applied a "conflict by implication" test. This test presents a broader analysis in
which "prohibiting one thing is considered the same as allowing what was not
prohibited."l45 Under this approach, there is no place for municipal regulations that
are stricter than those imposed by the state." Ohio courts have justified applying
this approach by claiming the legislature intended for uniformity across the state, and
it is not within the province of the court to determine policy.'47 Sometimes courts
blur direct and implication conflict analyses to generally "[d]etermining whether a
conflict exists" by "examin[ing] inconsistencies and contradictions between the
ordinance and the statute." 48
When Ohio courts have followed a direct analysis, they have held that an
ordinance is not inconsistent with a state regulation merely because it governs
further matters not covered by the statute.14 9 In Cincinnati v. Baskin, the defendant
was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of a Cincinnati ordinance.'s
Baskin argued that a Cincinnati ordinance prohibiting a semiautomatic rifle with a
capacity of more than ten rounds was in conflict with state law prohibiting
possession of a semiautomatic rifle of more than thirty-one rounds. In that case, the
Ohio Supreme Court did not recognize the conflict by implication argument, in large
part because the General Assembly had not expressly or impliedly occupied the
entire field of gun regulation, and thus, it held that Cincinnati's ordinance was not in
conflict with state law.' 5 '
Ohio courts have applied a conflict by implication approach whenever the
statutory language seems to require it. An example of express language from the
General Assembly can be found in Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v.
142 Sokol, 140 N.E. at 519.
143 See Traditions Tavern v. City of Columbus, 870 N.E.2d 1197 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
'" See City of Cincinnati v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio 2006).
145 City of Dayton v. Ohio, 813 N.E.2d at 726.
146 George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of
Municipal Power in Home Rule, 24 STETSON L. REv. 417,427 (1995).
147 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 784.
148 Rispo Realty & Dev. Co. v. City of Parma, 564 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ohio 1990).
149 Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 519; Benjamin v. City of Columbus, 146 N.E.2d 854, 864 (Ohio
1957).
150 Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 515.
"' Id. at 519.
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Painesville.'52 In that case, an Ohio statute expressly exempted intercity power lines
from the control of municipalities. So even though there was no actual conflict, the
court held that the transmission of electricity was in the "paramount interest of the
state to provide general laws regulating the intrastate transmission of such current
and to see that such transmission is not impeded by local regulation.""s3
In other cases, Ohio courts have found that the intent of the legislature was to
forbid municipalities to make any changes to state regulation in a certain field.'54
For example, in Neil House Hotel Co. v. Columbus, the court relied on statutory
language, allowing a liquor-premises licensee to sell until 2:30 AM, to read into the
text the implicit meaning that a municipality could not ban such sales by a licensee
prior to that hour.' 5 The court based its reasoning in part on a prior case in which a
statute had expressly said that municipalities could regulate an earlier time to start
prohibiting the sale of alcohol; whereas in Neil House Hotel Co., the statute made no
express exception."'
Because of the variance in conflict tests amongst Ohio courts, Justice Maureen
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Baskin, warned that the court needed to
determine whether Ohio courts were going to recognize conflict by implication.'
Justice O'Connor gives the following example to demonstrate the effect of
recognizing conflict by implication:
[I]f the state were to pass legislation stating that fireworks could not be
used between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., that statute would also implicitly
grant citizens the right to use fireworks between 6:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m.
Accordingly, any ordinance that purported to prohibit the use of fireworks
during different hours would conflict with the statute.'
If the Ohio Supreme Court were to adopt the concept of conflict purely by
implication, "[the court] would essentially be holding that a statute's prohibiting one
thing is the same as permitting everything else."15 9
To resolve which direction the court should move in, O'Connor examined the
legislative history behind the Home Rule Amendment. The provision was added in
order to overturn prior law where "even in the absence of an express state denial, a
stricter municipal regulation was in conflict."o60 As indicated by this change in
152 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Painesville, 239 N.E.2d 75 (Ohio 1968).
1'3 Id. at 78
154 See generally Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 167 N.E. 158 (Ohio 1929); Neil House Hotel
Co. v. City of Columbus, 58 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1944); City of Lorain v. Tomasic, 391 N.E.2d
726 (Ohio 1979); Clermont Envtl. Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 442 N.E.2d 1278 (Ohio
1982); Rispo Realty & Dev. Co. v. City of Parma, 564 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1990); Ohio Ass'n
of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. City of North Olmsted, 602 N.E.2d 1147 (Ohio 1992).
"s Neil House Hotel Co., 58 N.E.2d at 667-68.
156 City of Akron v. Scalera, 19 N.E.2d 279 (Ohio 1939).
" Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 520 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1ss Id.
159 Id.
' VAUBEL, supra note 115, at 679.
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language during the amendment process, Framers rejected the concept of conflict by
implication."6 ' "The delegates believed that as long as the state legislature did not
indicate an intent to occupy the field or to prevent a stricter standard, a municipality
could freely pass any ordinance stricter than state legislation, as long as the
ordinance could coexist with state legislation." 62
Also at the 1912 Constitutional Convention, Professor George W. Knight, a
Franklin County delegate, stated the general purpose of the Home Rule Amendment
was to create "a presumption in favor of the lawfulness of the municipalities' act,
and that presumption would only be overcome by showing that the power had been
denied to the municipalities or that it was against the general laws of the state. "163
Further, Knight said in regards to state general law that "a city can not make [state
regulations] less strict than the state, but it can make them more strict."'" A
municipality cannot take power away from a state general law, but the intent of the
Home Rule Amendment was to allow municipalities to add to state regulations. 6 s
Even though O'Connor reviewed the history of the Amendment, Ohio precedent,
and case law from other jurisdictions, her proposed Home Rule analysis would have
little to no effect. O'Connor directs Ohio courts to look if the General Assembly
intended to occupy a field with validly exercised legislative authority.'" In the
absence of such legislation, O'Connor would then apply a direct conflict analysis.'6 7
While O'Connor clarifies to an extent the method of the Home Rule analysis Ohio
courts should follow, her proposal effectively leaves the analysis in the status quo.
2. Comparing Ohio's Conflict Analysis to Other Jurisdictions
Justice O'Connor's proposed analysis, probing the express and implied intent of
the legislature, seems to mirror that of federal law. Under federal law, the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution governs preemption.6 Based on that clause,
Congress has the power to preempt state law as long as it acts within the scope of its
powers delegated by the Constitution. Congress can expressly preempt state law
when it explicitly states its intent to preempt that law, but if a statute does not
contain express preemption language, courts must resolve "whether the federal
statute's 'structure and purpose' or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless
reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent."' Federal courts recognize two
"' Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 521.
162 Id.
163 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Ohio:
Hearing on Municipal Home Rule, 64th Day (Ohio 1912) (statement of George W. Knight,
representative of Franklin County.).
'" Id. at 1439.
165 VAUBEL, supra note 115, at 680-81.
'66 Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 523-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167 Id.
168 U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2.
169 Forrester, supra note 26, at 1344-45 (citing Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31
(1996)).
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kinds of implied preemption: conflict preemption and field preemption."o Under a
federal conflict analysis, state law is preempted when a person could not comply
with both federal and state law because it would be a "physical impossibility."'
Field preemption takes place when Congress has taken the power of states to
legislate in a given field because the federal statute is "so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement
it." 72
Other states must also determine conflict under their home rule amendments.
While many states share Ohio's case by case approach to conflict analysis,"' other
states vary the test slightly. For instance, California merges its general law and
conflict analyses. In California, a municipal ordinance has a chance of surviving a
conflict analysis only when a court finds that an area of law is partially covered by
general law and the benefit to the municipality outweighs the benefit to all citizens
of the state.' 74 Michigan is similar to Ohio in that it applies a direct or conflict by
implication analysis depending on the circumstances. Michigan, however, has
narrowed and explicitly stated four factors for its courts to consider: (1) whether
state law expressly preempts the area of law, (2) whether preemption should be
implied based upon legislative history, (3) whether preemption may be implied
based on the pervasiveness of a state regulatory scheme, and (4) whether the nature
of the regulated subject matter demands exclusive state regulation to achieve the
uniformity necessary to serve the state's purpose or interest.7 1 While in both of
these states municipal ordinances face a greater challenge, the court's considerations
are clear to the legislatures at both the municipal and state level when drafting
legislation.
In other "Home Rule" states, "absent a clear manifestation of legislative intent to
preempt a field of regulation, a municipality may enact an ordinance which neither
conflicts with state legislation nor is itself unreasonable.""' Courts in states such as
Missouri, Connecticut, and Kansas have adopted this approach and permit local
170 See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt., 505 U.S. 88 (1992); Fla. Lime and Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
'' See Fla. Lime and Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 132.
172 Forrester, supra note 26, at 1345 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).
17 States that share Ohio's conflict analysis include Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington. See City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755
N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 2008); City of Morris v. Sax Invs., Inc., 749 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2008);
Lakeside Lodge, Inc. v. Town of New London, 960 A.2d 1268 (N.H. 2008); City of Las
Cruces v. Rogers, 215 P.3d 728 (N.M. 2009); Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of
Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2009); Salt Lake City v. Newman, 148 P.3d 931 (Utah 2006);
State v. Kirwin, 203 P.3d 1044 (Wash. 2009).
174 See Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, 872 P.2d 143 (Cal. 1994).
1s Michigan v. Llewellyn, 257 N.W.2d 902, 905 (Mich. 1977).
176 56 AM. JuR. 2D Municipal Corporations § 377 (2000).
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ordinances that regulate above and beyond what state law prohibits.' 7 7 The
Connecticut Supreme Court has explained this approach to conflict analysis:
[M]erely because a local ordinance, enacted pursuant to the
municipality's police power, provides higher standards than a statute on
the same subject does not render it necessarily inconsistent with the state
law. Whether a conflict exists depends on whether the ordinance permits
or licenses that which the statute forbids, or prohibits that which the
statute authorizes. If, however, both the statute and the ordinance are
prohibitory and the only difference is that the ordinance goes further in its
prohibition than the statute, but not counter to the prohibition in the
statute, and the ordinance does not attempt to authorize that which the
legislature has forbidden, or forbid that which the legislature has
expressly authorized, there is no conflict . . . . Where a municipal
ordinance merely enlarges on the provisions of a statute by requiring more
than a statute, there is no conflict unless the legislature has limited the
requirements for all cases. 7 1
To simply exemplify this approach, in Kansas City v. LaRose, a state crime
required a mens rea element, while a municipal ordinance did not. Essentially, the
ordinance criminalized more conduct than the state statute."' The Missouri Supreme
Court in that case held there was no conflict between the two because the ordinance
had simply "gone further" by expanding the prohibition. 1so
Other jurisdictions have settled on a conflict test, but Ohio courts have shifted
erratically from a direct to a conflict by implication analysis, especially when
prompted by the General Assembly to do so. Because it is unpredictable exactly
how Ohio courts will read the legislative history and intent behind a state enactment,
whether it will find an enactment is general law and ultimately whether it will find a
conflict with a municipal ordinance it equally unpredictable. Thus, we should heed
Justice O'Connor's warning that the courts should clarify their; however, following
her approach would only further incentivize the General Assembly to strip municipal
home rule power and Ohio courts to follow a conflict by implication analysis.
Further exploration of Ohio courts' Home Rule analysis in the context of predatory
lending is useful in ascertaining modifications necessary to greatly improve just
outcomes.
177 See Greater New Haven Prop. Owners Ass'n v. City of New Haven, 951 A.2d 551
(Conn. 2008); Steffes v. City of Lawrence, 160 P.3d 843 (Kan. 2007); Walsh, 189 N.W.2d at
324 ("Mere differences in detail do not render [statute and ordinance] conflicting. If either is
silent where the other speaks, there can be no conflict between them. Where no conflict
exists, both laws stand.... As a general rule, additional regulation to that of a state law does
not constitute a conflict therewith.").
178 Greater New Haven Prop. Owners Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 559. In this case, a state statute
did not expressly authorize the licensing and inspections of residential rental real estate
required by a New Haven ordinance. The court held that "the statute does not prohibit such
requirements, and those requirements do not frustrate the achievement of the state's
objectives." Id.
17 Kansas City v. LaRose, 524 S.W.2d 112, 117 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
180 Id.
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IV. OHIO COURTS' APPLICATION OF HOME RULE ANALYSIS TO MUNICIPAL
PREDATORY LENDING REGULATION
Because Ohio courts have been unpredictable as to which conflict analysis they
will apply in any scenario, it is useful to examine their application of the Home Rule
analysis solely in the context of predatory lending regulation in search of some
clarity to their methodology. These cases arose when special interest groups of the
lending industry quickly challenged that municipal ordinances regulating predatory
lending conflicted with state law on the matter. After a number of Ohio's appellate
courts came to a wide range of conclusions applying the Home Rule analysis on
similar fact patterns, the Ohio Supreme Court in American Financial Services Ass'n
v. Cleveland sought to provide finality to the issues of whether the state's predatory
lending regulation is general law under Ohio's Home Rule Amendment,"' and, if the
regulation constitutes "general law," whether local predatory lending ordinances
imposing stricter requirements on lending transactions conflict with the state's
predatory lending statutes.'
The Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in American Financial Services Ass'n v.
Cleveland first determined whether an ordinance is enacted under a municipality's
local-governance or police powers granted under the Home Rule Amendment."'
Predatory lending regulation is correctly classified as promulgated under a
municipality's police power because it is not solely a matter of local governance.'"
For this reason, the litigants did not dispute whether the predatory lending regulation
was enacted under the police power.'
Next, the court applied the Canton test to determine whether the Ohio regulations
were "general laws." Before beginning the Canton test, the court recognized that the
General Assembly announced its intent to occupy the power to regulate in this
matter, making predatory lending a matter of statewide concern, but stated that intent
alone is not sufficient to "trump the constitutional authority of municipalities to
enact legislation pursuant to the Home Rule Amendment, provided that the local
legislation is not in conflict with general laws."' The court found that the
enactment was part of comprehensive statewide legislation to regulate consumer
mortgage lending that would apply equally to all lending entities in the state, and, in
context, the enactment did not only seek to limit municipal power."' Because the
enactment established rules of conduct for all Ohio citizens by regulating lenders and
providing recourse for all consumers subject to predatory loans, the court concluded
that the Canton test was satisfied. Therefore, the court determined that Ohio's
predatory lending statutes are "general laws" within the meaning of the Home Rule
Amendment.'
1' OHIo CONsT. art. XVIH, § 3. See infra Part II.C.
182 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 780.
183 Saul, supra note 122, at 840.
1 See id.
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After making the "general law" determination, the court next considered whether
Cleveland's ordinance conflicted with state law. The American Financial
Association's argument was that the ordinance was in conflict with the state law
because the ordinance imposed additional restrictions in some instances that would
have been permissible under state law."'9 Cleveland countered by arguing that the
ordinance did not conflict with state law because the ordinance's regulatory scheme
was prohibitory, meaning that the ordinance did not authorize loans actually
prohibited by the state, it merely placed more preventive measures than state law.1o
The Ohio Supreme Court in that case also had to resolve an appellate court split.
Interestingly, the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals, in applying the Canton test
in this case, concluded that Revised Code section 1.63, which expressly stated that
municipal ordinances were preempted by state law in the predatory lending field, did
not constitute a "general law": because this enactment seeking to deprive
municipalities of their Home Rule police power applies only to legislative bodies,
and not to citizens generally, the court held it is not "general law" and is thus
unconstitutional.'91 There was no conflict between statutory provisions covering
predatory loans and the ordinance because absent the statutory language that was
found in Revised Code section 1.63 limiting local governance, "a city is permitted to
adopt greater protections, requirements, or standards than those of the state, provided
no conflict is presented."l92 The court, applying the direct conflict analysis, held that
the ordinance does not permit what state law expressly prohibits, but state law only
sets a minimum requirement that does not expressly limit any stricter regulations
imposed by a city.9 '
Similarly, the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals in American Financial
Services Ass'n v. Toledo also applied the direct conflict test, thus allowing provisions
of the statutes in direct conflict with the state regulation to be severed from the
Toledo ordinance.194 The Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals held that the state
legislation unconstitutionally preempted any municipal regulation of predatory
lending in violation of the Home Rule Amendment, and when local and state law
conflicted, if possible, that provision could be severed from the ordinance.195
In Dayton v. Ohio, the City of Dayton brought suit against the State for
declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Revised Code section 1.63 was not
comprehensive, statewide regulation of predatory lending, but merely served to limit
Dayton's legislative power."' The Second District Court of Appeals held that
189 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 19 Ohio Mun. Serv. 17 (2007).
190 Id. "The local ordinance cannot prohibit something that the statute permits because the
statute does not permit anything, and the local ordinance cannot permit something that the
statute prohibits because the ordinance does not permit anything." Merit Brief, City of
Cleveland at 11, Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006)
(No. 2005-0160).
191 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 824 N.E.2d 553, 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
192 Id. at 560.
193 Id.
194 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Toledo, 830 N.E.2d at 1248-49.
195 Id. at 1244-45, 1248-49.
196 City of Dayton v. Ohio, 813 N.E.2d at 713.
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Ohio's law was a general law, expressing that while certain provisions attempt to
limit municipal power, the statutes must be read in context of broader legislation.'"
That court recognized that "[u]nder 'conflict by implication,' a court would conclude
that a conflict exists" but "[u]nder a narrower construction, another court might find
no conflict."' 98 The court established that whichever course the court chooses, case
law could be found to support their decision.'" In deciding to follow the intent of
the legislature, thus applying a conflict by implication analysis, the court found that
Dayton's stricter regulations were preempted by state law.20
The Ohio Supreme Court in American Financial Services Ass'n v. Cleveland
followed the Dayton court's approach and applied the broader, conflict by
implication analysis rather than a direct conflict test. The court held that "any local
ordinances that seek to prohibit conduct that the state has authorized are in conflict
with the state statutes and are therefore unconstitutional."20 1 Because the Cleveland
ordinance sought to regulate loans in a field generally occupied by state regulations
and, more specifically, loans that were allowable by state law, the ordinance's loan
regulations were held unconstitutional.202
V. INCORPORATING LOCAL INTERESTS INTO OHIO'S HOME RULE AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS: REMOVING THE PREEMPTION SHIELD PROTECTING PREDATORY LENDING
AND RESTORING MUNICIPALITIES' HOME RULE POLICE POWER
A. Preemption as a Shieldfor Predatory Lending
From a review of statistical evidence, it is apparent that the housing market in
Ohio cities became flooded with foreclosures after preemption of local predatory
lending regulation.203 The question that must be asked is: if the Ohio General
Assembly truly intended to combat one of the most serious problems facing the state,
why were the legislators seemingly content to regulate predatory lending at a less
restrictive threshold than cities across the state? When the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the stricter local ordinances conflicted by implication with state regulation, it
reinforced the shield predatory lenders exploit to escape liability directly from
individual consumers subjected to subprime lending and indirectly from
municipalities with deteriorating urban areas.204
"Legislative concern for public safety is not only a proper police power
objective-it is a mandate."20 s Rightfully, both state and local governments sought
'1 Id. at 722.
'9' Id. at 726.
" Id. at 726-27.
200 Id. at 727.
201 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 785.
202 Id. at 785-86.
203 See Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Cases, supra note 11. In Cuyahoga County alone,
more than 45,000 foreclosure cases were filed from the beginning of 2006 through early 2009.
Id.
204 See Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
205 Ephraim, 898 N.E.2d at 978.
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to deter predatory lending through their police powers; however, state legislators
refused to regulate past a threshold that certain Ohio communities deemed necessary
for their own protection. Even though the general purpose of predatory lending is
seeking to protect the public, many in the lending industry oppose municipal
regulations. Some members of the lending industry contend that municipal
regulation would constitute an overly restrictive patchwork of regulation that would
create confusion and increase the cost of borrowing, while decreasing the availability
of credit for sub-prime borrowers, thus harming the people who should be helped by
the legislation.206 Further, lenders support regulation only on the state level by
claiming it is the only true way to prevent an exodus of lenders from Ohio.207
While many of these concerns are warranted, municipal ordinances sought only
to govern loans at thresholds that were disproportionately affecting their
communities. Unfortunately, state legislators bought into the lending industry's
argument for uniformity across the state and, in doing so, provided protection for
predatory lending by expressly preempting municipalities from regulating predatory
lending.208 The lending industry's arguments, however, lose merit as predatory
lending has continued to operate behind the preemption shield created by Ohio law
in the absence of more restrictive municipal regulation. By allowing such great
influence from lending institutions on state lawmakers, potentially liable parties are,
in essence, regulating themselves. The General Assembly, by expressly depriving
municipalities of the power of local governance for regulating predatory lending, and
the Ohio Supreme Court, by failing to see this enactment as pretext to the extent it
only sought to overrule local ordinances by occupying the general field of predatory
lending, have created a stalwart wall to allow subprime lending to continue. The
Ohio Supreme Court by denying municipalities the Home Rule conflict analysis as
intended by the Framers has not acted in "[its] role as guardian of the state
Constitution"" and should modify its analysis to restore its role as guardian and
guarantee consistency.
B. Incorporating Local Interests into Ohio's Home Rule Amendment Analysis
Would Allow Cities to Better Protect Themselves from the Disproportionate Impact
Experienced from Predatory Lending
The Ohio Supreme Court's Home Rule analysis is not consistent with the
original intent behind Ohio's Home Rule Amendment. That Amendment was added
to the Ohio Constitution in order to give municipalities powers that they did not have
before its enactment, including the ability to legislate and enforce police regulations
that did not directly conflict with state law.210 In other words, the Framers rejected
206 Dickerson, supra note 28, at 39; Brief of Amicus Curiae, the Ohio Ass'n of Mortgage
Brokers, Urging Reversal in Support of Appellant American Financial Services Ass'n, Am.
Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006) (No. 2005-0160).
207 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 206.
208 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1.63; see Tynan, supra note 23, at 880. The use of preemption
shields is not an isolated occurrence. See Adam Liptak, No Legal Shield in Drug Labeling,
Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/
washington/05scotus.html?_r-1.
209 Fondessy Enter., 492 N.E.2d at 803 (Locher, J., concurring).
210 See VAUBEL, supra note 115, at 14-15.
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solely following the General Assembly's intent over a municipality's interest and
required an actual conflict analysis.2"
Ohio courts originally allowed municipalities to regulate using their police power
unless there was a direct conflict with state law,2 12 following the express language of
the direct conflict test set out in Struthers.2 1 3 While some previous courts had used
conflict by implication to find municipal ordinances preempted,2 14 not until
Cleveland v. Betts did the court read a conflict by implication approach into the
Home Rule Amendment.2 15 That court held that although the ordinance did not meet
Struthers test, it did "contravene the expressed policy of the state with respect to
crimes by deliberately changing an act which constitutes a felony under state law
into a misdemeanor, and this creates the kind of conflict contemplated by the
Constitution.""'
Where Ohio courts were once praised by commentators as protecting both state
and local issues by applying a direct conflict analysis,' modern courts seem to have
taken to the conflict by implication approach, and, in the process, have taken power
that the Framers intended for municipalities and effectively returned it to the state.
Today, Ohio courts have been unpredictable in whether they will apply a direct or
conflict by implication analysis."' The express language of the Amendment, the
intent behind the Amendment, and judicial precedent support Ohio courts following
a direct approach.220 Ohio courts, however, have started reaching further and further,
in an effort to find general law in order to promote "uniformity," even though ill
effects have not been borne equally by the citizens of Ohio. In essence, the courts
are merging the finding of general law with whether a statute and ordinance actually
conflict with one another.22' A conflict analysis is devastating to municipal interests
when it is based upon the proposition that what the state does not forbid, it permits.
When courts apply a conflict by implication analysis, Ohio courts give too much
power to the General Assembly, contravening the original intent behind the Home
Rule Amendment.222 Further, it increases the uncertainties of court discretion.223
211 Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 521.
212 Sokol, 140 N.E. at 519 (paragraph two of court's syllabus).
213 id
214 See Schneiderman, 167 N.E. at 158; Neil House Hotel Co., 58 N.E.2d at 665.
215 City of Cleveland v. Betts, 154 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ohio 1958).
216 id
217 See Vaubel, supra note 146, at 440.
218 See VAUBEL, supra note 115, at 679.
219 See Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514; Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at
784; Fondessy Enter., 492 N.E.2d at 800.
220 See VAUBEL, supra note 115, at 679.
221 See Fondessy Enter., 492 N.E.2d at 800.
222 Vaubel, supra note 146, at 427.
223 id
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When Ohio courts choose to apply a conflict by implication analysis in the
context of predatory lending under the cover of "uniformity," the resulting
preemption shield protecting predatory lenders has put Ohio's cities in imminent
danger due to the negative spillover effects of the ongoing foreclosure crisis. While
the outcome of recent increased restrictions on predatory lending remains to be seen,
allowing lending institutions to manipulate the law around their interest risks leaving
both mortgage consumers and cities without legal recourse. The Ohio Supreme
Court contributed to the severe foreclosure and public nuisance crises plaguing
Ohio's cities by upholding the General Assembly's bill expressly stripping
municipalities of the use of their Home Rule police power to contend with predatory
lending.224
The General Assembly was not given the power under the Home Rule
Amendment to expressly strip municipal police power; on the contrary, the
Amendment was passed with the intent to give municipalities that power.225 By
allowing the General Assembly to expressly deny municipal power, the court
generally finds a field preempted and voids a municipal ordinance that does not
actually conflict with state law.226 This broad prohibition on municipal power
related to predatory lending "emasculates local governments from impacting
economic and social problems facing their constituents and has implications beyond
the predatory and subprime lending issues.""
This protection for predatory lending can be dismantled if Ohio courts considered
the local interest and intent behind the ordinance when applying a Home Rule
analysis. Ohio courts can do this in two ways. First, the courts could alter their
approach for determining general law to a totality of the circumstances test, giving
local interests naturally more weight in a court's decision. Along with this
modification, Ohio courts must keep this step of the analysis separate, otherwise it
risks not even applying a conflict test when the Home Rule Amendment so
requires.228 Second, Ohio courts could apply a narrower, direct conflict analysis, as
intended by the Amendment Framers, to capture the local needs of a community. By
following these proposed modifications, a municipality will have some degree of
control over its own future as the Home Rule Amendment Framers intended. These
solutions are generally applicable beyond predatory lending regulation and in other
jurisdictions that have denied municipal regulatory power.
1. Proposed Modification to Ohio Courts' General Law Analysis
The determination of general law is an integral part of the Home Rule Analysis.
Isolating the analysis to the intent of the General Assembly without any
consideration of local interest behind an ordinance, passed by elected representatives
of the people of that municipality, is unreasonable, unfair, and not in line with the
original intent behind the Home Rule Amendment. This is especially true when
224 See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 785-86.
225 See VAUBEL, supra note 115, at 14-15.
226 See Fondessy Enter., 492 N.E.2d at 800.
227 Tynan, supra note 23, at 884.
228 See Fondessy Enter., 492 N.E.2d at 800; Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 520 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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Ohio courts merge the finding of general law into an automatic assumption of
conflict by implication.2 29 Without giving any weight to the legislative intent behind
an ordinance or the potential impact of not having such regulation, Ohio's
municipalities are left with limited effective recourse in combating a public nuisance
that is disproportionately affecting their communities, especially in the context of
predatory lending regulation.
Predatory lending affects the entire state, but the most severe cases are
concentrated in Ohio's largest cities.230 In support of its finding that Ohio predatory
lending regulation is a general law, the Ohio Supreme Court referenced decisions
finding local ordinances unconstitutional for imposing speed limits that were lower
than permitted by state law, mandating earlier closing times for liquor stores than
were permitted by state liquor regulations, and instituting lower local limits on bingo
parlor payouts than were permitted by state gaming laws.231 Unfortunately, the court
failed to acknowledge the special position predatory lending must occupy.
While all of the referenced cases limit certain detrimental activities Ohioans may
not want present in their towns, speed limits, closing times, and bingo payouts all
apply to people generally, rather than disproportionately to certain demographics-
as is the case with predatory lending. Interestingly, these "general law" examples
often took into account local variables when determining appropriate regulation. For
instance, speed limits on state roads are often lower in crowded, urban areas than in
more rural parts of the state for safety reasons based on engineering studies done on
local traffic pattems. 23 2  Because legislators can investigate the individual
characteristics of a community to properly govern traffic laws, certainly predatory
lending regulation presents another prime area to employ such measures to mend
Ohio's disproportionally afflicted cities.
Beyond Ohio courts' apparent contradiction as to what constitutes general law
from an abstract standpoint, empirical data shows that predatory lending has had a
disproportionate impact on those cities with ordinances that were preempted by state
law. A recent study reveals that the financial burden has fallen to the tax base of
municipalities. For instance, Cleveland and Dayton households suffer a cost of
nearly $200 each, while Columbus households, a city composed of a smaller amount
of the populations targeted by predatory lenders, are only faced with a cost of $20
per household."' This alarming discrepancy between these figures shows that courts
should consider local interests as well when determining if a state enactment is
general law. While this consideration may seem to be too political for the judiciary,
Ohio courts have a duty to uphold the Ohio Constitution, including protecting
municipalities' power to regulate under the authority of the Home Rule
229 See Fondessy Enter., 492 N.E.2d at 800.
230 Nelson, supra note 2, at 5.
231 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 784.
232 Speed Zones: Ohio Speed Limits, OHIO DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
http://www.dot.state.oh.us/districts/DO1/PlanningPrograms/trafficstudies/SpeedZones/Pages/d
efault.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
233 CMTY. RESEARCH PARTNERS & REBUILD OHIo, supra note 16, at iix (executive
summary).
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Amendment.234 A modification of Ohio's general law analysis would serve to better
protect municipalities and not allow the General Assembly to deny municipal
regulatory police power whenever it deems appropriate.
Ohio currently follows the guidelines set out by the Canton court. A statute is
"general law" within the meaning of the Home Rule Amendment if it: (1) is part of a
statewide, comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) prescribes a rule of conduct
upon citizens generally, (3) applies equally to all parts of the state, and (4) sets forth
police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit
legislative power of a municipality.2 35 The major flaw of this analysis is that it does
not include any consideration of a municipality's interest in its ordinance.
Effectively, it is an outright denial of municipal Home Rule police regulations
whenever the court sees fit, regardless of the importance or impact on a given
community. Further, as seen from the appellate and Ohio Supreme Court decisions
from American Financial Services Ass'n v. Cleveland, this factors test leads to
unpredictable results from Ohio courts as to what constitutes a general law,236
making it difficult for both state and local legislatures to write effective legislation
with a high probability of surviving judicial scrutiny.
While scrapping a factors test in favor of a bright line rule to determine if a
statute qualifies as general law would greatly improve the predictability of case
outcomes, creating a list of "per se" general laws would be difficult and inherently
incomplete. Instead, Ohio should modify its approach to mirror some aspects of
other states' analyses. California's approach, for example, looks at the operation of
the legislation when the legislature has not expressly preempted municipal
regulation.237 Specifically, California courts must balance the harm to state citizens
generally with the local benefits secured through municipal regulation."' Ohio
courts should consider adding a similar factor to its analysis that would weigh the
local benefits in comparison with the harm caused to other state citizens.
An even better solution for Ohio courts may be to do away with the Canton
guidelines and instead adopt a totality of the circumstances test similar to
Colorado's. In Colorado, courts consider the necessity of uniform statewide
regulation, extraterritorial impact, other state interests, and local interests, among
other considerations.239 While this may not make Ohio's general law analysis any
more predictable, by considering local interests, Colorado's totality of the
circumstances approach would offer some protection to municipalities' Home Rule
Amendment police power and to the legislative intent behind their ordinances by
requiring Ohio courts to consider local interests.
Even outside the context of predatory lending, accounting for a community's
interest is not detrimental to situations where the state should properly govern when
234 See Curtis Rodebush, Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Critical Analysis, 51 CLEv. ST.
L. REv. 505, 516-17 (2004).
235 City of Canton v. Ohio, 766 N.E.2d at 968.
236 See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 784; Am. Fin. Servs.
Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 824 N.E.2d 553, 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
237 Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 14.
238 id
239 U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc., 948 P.2d at 515.
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there is "general law," and a municipal ordinance directly conflicts with that law.
For example, in Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde, a citizens' group
challenged a city ordinance prohibiting licensed handgun owners from carrying
concealed handguns in city parks.240 That court applied the Canton test and
determined that state law set out statewide, comprehensive legislation for police
regulations governing concealed carry that proscribed a rule upon Ohio citizens
generally to apply uniformly throughout the state.24' Adding a consideration of local
interest to the general law analysis would do little to the outcome of this case
because the state's "general law" claim was more compelling than the minimal
interest of the municipality. In this case, the state regulation there did "more than
merely prevent municipalities from enacting inconsistent laws. It provided a
program to foster proper, legal handgun ownership in this state."242
By adding a local consideration to the general law analysis, a municipal police
regulation that is direly needed by a community-like one needed to prevent
predatory lending-will have a much higher survival rate. Modifying the analysis to
include such a factor would also prevent the Ohio Supreme Court from merging the
general law and conflict analysis because conflict by implication would be much
harder to find when local interests are considered against those of the General
Assembly.
2. Proposed Modification to Ohio Courts' Conflict Analysis
In American Financial Services Ass'n v. Cleveland, the Ohio Supreme Court
applied a conflict by implication analysis rather than a direct analysis. The court
determined that state law occupied the entire field of predatory lending regulation.
Specifically in that case, even though Cleveland sought to regulate loans at a lower
threshold than state law, lending institutions could have complied with both state and
municipal law. If the court had applied a direct conflict analysis, the stricter
regulations of Cleveland's ordinance not in direct contradiction with state law would
have remained in effect and could have protected consumer populations who were at
greater risk to predatory lending.24 3
Again, Ohio's direct conflict analysis test is "whether the ordinance permits or
licenses that which the, statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa."2" The Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland was troubling in that it found a conflict
between municipal and state law even though the express definition of the words
used in this test indicates that laws that are prohibitory cannot conflict when one
regulates further. Ohio courts could greatly improve their fairness and consistency
by not broadly interpreting this rule. Additionally, Ohio courts would hardly be
alone in adopting a stricter interpretation of the conflict test.
240 Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 896 N.E.2d 967, 968-69 (Ohio
2008).
241 Id. at 973-76.
242 Id. at 975.
243 See Greater New Haven Prop. Owners Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 559; Walsh, 189 N.W.2d at
326; LaRose, 524 S.W.2d at 117.
244 Am. Fin. Serys. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 784.
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Other states that follow a direct conflict analysis have interpreted the rule to
uphold municipal ordinances that regulate conduct above and beyond what state law
does not expressly prohibit, or that regulate where state law is silent.2 4 5 "Where a
municipal ordinance merely enlarges on the provisions of a statute by requiring more
than a statute, there is no conflict unless the legislature has limited the requirements
for all cases."2" If the Ohio Supreme Court had followed a stricter interpretation of
its conflict analysis as applied by courts such as those in Connecticut or Missouri,247
the court could have removed only those statutes that were in direct conflict, without
denying municipalities their Home Rule police powers.
Ohio courts have justified the conflict by implication analysis by stating "it is
not the province of the court to formulate or declare a policy," yet, in essence, that is
what the court does by almost automatically assuming that local ordinances are
preempted when a state law regulates a matter within the same field.2 49 The Dayton
court even went as far as to say that "uniform legislation is a better way to solve the
problem than having many conflicting requirements at the state and local level."250
While the Ohio Supreme Court was concerned that subjecting lenders to different
regulation would deter lending, that was exactly the activity that municipal
legislators were trying to control. The municipal ordinances did not seek to stop all
lending; only certain lending that had adverse effects on the community. By
applying a conflict by implication analysis, instead of a direct conflict test, the court
strengthened predatory lenders' ability to continue to operate within Ohio and in the
process stripped a municipality's regulatory police power almost entirely.
There are many reasons Ohio courts should apply a direct conflict analysis. First,
a direct analysis is consistent with the intent behind the Home Rule Amendment to
grant municipalities power. Consequently, there should be a presumption in favor of
the lawfulness of a municipality's act unless it directly conflicts with the general
laws of the state. In other words, a municipality cannot make state regulations less
strict because that would be permitting what the state had expressly prohibited, but
they can make regulations that are stricter.25'
Next, a direct conflict analysis would capture the unique needs of a community's
population. Cleveland, for instance, sought to protect its specific demographic
makeup exposed to a greater risk of predatory lending by regulating above and
245 See Greater New Haven Prop. Owners Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 559; Steffes, 160 P.3d at 843;
Walsh, 189 N.W.2d at 324 (a local ordinance that regulates in an area where a state statute
also regulates, with mere differences in detail, is not rendered invalid due to conflict).
246 Greater New Haven Prop. Owners Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 559. In this case, a state statute
did not expressly authorize the licensing and inspections of residential rental real estate
required by a New Haven ordinance. The court held that "the statute does not prohibit such
requirements, and those requirements do not frustrate the achievement of the state's
objectives." Id.
247 See Greater New Haven Prop. Owners Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 559; LaRose, 524 S.W.2d at
117.
248 See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d at 784.
249 See id.
250 City of Dayton v. Ohio, 813 N.E.2d at 730.
251 See supra Part III.C.L.
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beyond what the state proscribed.252 While a number of Ohio's larger cities have
sought to protect themselves from predatory lending, many municipalities in Ohio
have not sought to prevent predatory lending, indicating the problem does not rise to
the level of a statewide concern. In fact, of Ohio's 940 municipalities, few have
enacted municipal predatory lending regulation. 253 This suggests that a majority of
Ohio's communities do not view predatory lending as a pressing issue, and that
conditions in certain communities have created the need for localized predatory
lending legislation.
Further, a direct conflict analysis should also be applied because abandoned
properties constituting public nuisances tend to concentrate more in Ohio cities than
in rural areas.254 Because public nuisance leads to many safety issues and drains
resources, especially when it is concentrated in certain areas, courts should allow
local legislatures to determine the best course of action before a problem
disproportionally affects their city.255 Again, a narrow conflict analysis, preempting
only those ordinances in direct contradiction to state law, would allow for any
regulations above and beyond the minimum state prescribed regulation based on the
specific needs of a municipality and would be in line with the intent of the Home
Rule Framers.
3. Modifications to Ohio's Home Rule Analysis Will not only Restore
Municipalities' Home Rule Police Powers, but Will also Incentivize the General
Assembly to Pass More Effective Legislation
Perfect legislation is an impossible ideal, but states should take precautions to
ensure the quality and effectiveness of their laws.2 56 When adopting the Home Rule
Amendment, the Framers of 1912 Ohio Constitution did not view greater municipal
power as an "invitation for disaster," but rather welcomed it as "greater control by
the people of [Ohio] over their own destinies and an opportunity for municipalities
to enact legislation complementing state legislation." 257 When Ohio courts apply a
conflict by implication analysis, the General Assembly has no incentive to pass
better legislation. Applying a direct conflict analysis would allow local interests to
carry greater weight in the Home Rule Analysis, which in turn would incentivize the
General Assembly to be precise in the scope of its enactments. Additionally, a direct
conflict analysis would demand legislation that shows more explicitly that it
constitutes "general law" in substance and not just form. The General Assembly's
enactments should be subject to judicial scrutiny and not receive a free pass just
because it intends to regulate in a given field.
252 CLEVELAND, OIo, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 659.01 (f) (2002); see Nelson, supra note 2,
at 5.
253 Municipalities in Ohio, OHIO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,
http://www.omunileague.org/Legislation/SenateWaysandMeansTestimony.htm (last visited
Mar. 27, 2011).
254 See MALLACH ET AL., supra note 3.
255 id
256 "The problem with courts' making judgments about the effectiveness of legislation is
that perfect legislation is never written." City of Dayton v. Ohio, 813 N.E.2d at 723.
257 Fondessy Enter., 492 N.E.2d at 803 (Locher, J., concurring).
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In the context of predatory lending, the General Assembly's policy justification
is that state law uniformity benefits consumers because it keeps the mortgage
process simple and encourages lending beneficial for the state's economy. Yet, this
reasoning is flawed. Predatory lending destroys consumers' credit and often wipes
out a large portion of a person's wealth because Americans traditionally invest in
home ownership.258 Additionally, because predatory lending is a contributing factor
to public nuisances across the state, protecting the practice both deteriorates the tax
base while demanding public and private expenditures toward nuisance abatement.259
Instead of switching between different analyses, applying a direct conflict
analysis would give state and municipal legislatures an incentive to improve clarity,
specificity, and thoroughness in its enactments, while denying predatory lenders
legal maneuverability. For instance, if states allowed local regulation, even for a
limited time, the municipalities could have acted as "laboratories" experimenting
with various kinds of regulation.260 Certain provisions of the municipal predatory
lending regulation would have failed, but just as many would have likely been
effective in combating predatory lending if they had not been voided under a conflict
by implication approach. The legislature could observe the successes and failures of
municipalities, and with that knowledge, pass effective, comprehensive legislation
that eliminates the need for more restrictive local ordinances by accounting for
special local circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether in the case of predatory lending or other issues that will differ from
location to location, municipalities should continue to protect their cities by
exercising their power under the Home Rule Amendment to enforce regulations not
in direct conflict with Ohio law.26' Even though the Framers of the Home Rule
Amendment intended to protect municipal power by ensuring that only those
ordinances in actual conflict would be voided, Ohio courts have denied
municipalities their Home Rule police power by applying a conflict by implication
test, contributing to the housing crisis still plaguing Ohio's cities. While Ohio courts
have made clear that it is not the position of the judiciary to consider policy, courts
can follow the lead of other jurisdictions that consider the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether state regulation constitutes a general law.
Also, beyond following the intent of the Framers, Ohio courts should apply a direct
conflict analysis to better capture local variables and needs, especially when matters
have a disproportionate effect on certain communities. By following these proposed
modifications a municipality will have better control over its own future as the
Framers intended. In turn, the increased consistency from the courts would stimulate
both the General Assembly and city councils to enact improved legislation.
258 See Jack Hough, Renting Makes More Financial Sense than Homeownership, SMART
MONEY (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.smartmoney.com/personal-finance/real-estate/renting-
makes-more-financial-sense-than-homeownership-2 1111/.
259 See MALLACH ET AL., supra note 3, at 7.
260 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005).
261 Entin & Yazback, supra note 93, at 779.
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